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THE DESPAIR OF CIVILIZATION 
HE eighteenth century registered a shift from rea- T soned theodicy and complacent optimism towards 
manifold disdain, revulsion, and rebellion : a shift gradual 
a t  first which gained momentum. A movement which found 
its two leaders in Voltaire and Rousseau is not to be defined 
in a simple formula; the transition of the European mind 
from the placid Enlightenment to the Romantic revolt in- 
volved a revision in logic which not only elicited new con- 
clusions from old premises, but likewise imposed radically 
new propositions for new syllogisms. 
T h e  theodicies in prose and in verse had agreed that 
“Whatever is, is right;” the new spirit could have found its 
motto in the words of Marcellus in Hamlet: “Something 
is rotten in the state of Denmark;” but there was grave 
disagreement in diagnosis as to what was rotten. Voltaire, 
embittered by the stupidity, intolerance, and cruelty of men, 
dismayed by the brutal indifference of nature to  human weal 
o r  woe, defiantly scorned the idea of benevolent Divine 
Providence as a superstition; but holding fast to his trust in 
the intellect and in civilization, never lost faith in progress 
through enlightenment and tolerance. Rousseau’s diagnosis 
was both simpler and more radical: God is good, and so is 
man as God made him; evil is not in nature but unnatural, 
due to  the corruption of man by civilization, with its pride 
of intellect, its depravity, injustice, and oppression of man 
by man. 
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This is no mere pundit controversy: both as allies and 
as opponents these two men loom large, not only in the 
history of ideas, but in the pages of Europe’s political and 
social life during the last century and a half. T h e  seething 
multitudes, which greeted Voltaire on his triumphal return 
to Paris in 1778, after an absence of thirty years, stormed 
the Bastile eleven years later. M a r a t  read Rousseau’s Colz- 
trat Social to enthusiastic audiences in the public squares of 
Paris, and Robespierre undertook to make revolutionary 
France worship a t  the shrine of the Savoyard Vicar. Em- 
press Catherine of Russia, aghast a t  perceiving the real 
drift of the new ideas, ordered Voltaire’s bust removed from 
her desk to the lumber-room, but her caution was tardy and 
futile. 
T h e  earliest revolutionaries of Russia were avowed Vol- 
taireans, and endeavored to  reenact in Petersburg and in 
Moscow the Paris drama of emancipation. Young Tolstoy 
carried around his neck a medallion with Rousseau’s por- 
trait, and it was on the centenary of Rousseau’s death that 
Tolstoy began in earnest his social and religious apostolate. 
While a good deal besides Voltaire and Rousseau has en- 
tered into the Russian revolution, whose tenth anniversary 
was celebrated but yesterday, is it quite beside the point to 
indicate the clash of motives, both social-political and cul- 
tural-religious, which divide Russian liberal and radical 
opinion today: and is it altogether misleading to compare 
this clash of motives with the clash in the French Revolu- 
tion of the Voltairean and the Rousseauistic strains? 
Voltaire had started in his youth as an optimistic be- 
liever in Divine Providence and Infinite Benevolent Justice. 
But increasing scepticism, lifelong conflict with ecclesiastic 
bigotry, which embittered him against all organized religion, 
made his view of the world increasingly grim. Hi s  ironical 
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reaction against his earlier optimism came to a head in 1 7 5 5 ,  
after the Lisbon earthquake, and in his poem on the Lisboii 
Disaster he shocked all Europe with his violent disdain of 
all theodicies and of all doctrines of Divine Providence in 
this best of all possible worlds. 
Do the facts of life justify belief in a benevolent Divine 
Providence, and if they do not, what standing ground is left 
for despairing but unyielding humanity? How is placid the- 
odicy to dispose of a Lisbon disaster? Is Lisbon engulfed 
because of its sins? But then why not Paris and London as 
well? Or if the earthquake is a mere event in the order of 
nature, is it beyond the reach of Divine Goodness to pre- 
vent, or has it been preferred by Eternal Wisdom as the 
least evil of all possible alternatives? Would the universe 
have been worse for sparing Lisbon this disaster? Is God 
testing Lisbon’s virtue in his fiery furnace? O r  is he the im- 
passive spectator of his anguished creation? O r  is matter, 
crude and resistant to  Divine Perfection, the source and 
medium of our woes? These are all blind alleys and lead us 
to shuddering confusion. Voltaire says. “Alas, I am like a 
doctor; I know nothing.” 
This dark scepticism is not of the tragically pious variety, 
as Pascal’s; it is deliberately and sneeringly aggressive. In  
this wretched world one of Voltaire’s undoubted joys, dur- 
ing the later par t  of his life, was flaying optimists to dis- 
close their unsound substance. His irony is blighting. What  
do you mean by your formula that “all is well in this 
world?’’ Ordered it is in accordance with moving forces 
and necessary laws; but can you mean that it is a happy 
world, that all is well with you, with me, that no one suf- 
fe rs?  “Here  is an odd general good, composed of gallstones, 
gout, and all sorts of crimes, sufferings, death, and damna- 
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tion.” So Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope speak of the 
universal order;  and universal it is: “Flies are born to  be 
devoured by spiders, who in turn are devoured by swallows, 
and swallows by shrikes, and shrikes by eagles, and eagles 
are born to be killed by men, who in turn live to kill each 
other and to be consumed by worms o r  by devils, a t  least 
in a thousand cases to  one.” T h e  novel Caizdidc is an elab- 
orate satire on this best of all possible worlds. Fa r  be it 
from poor Candide to  doubt the ‘metaphysico-theologo- 
cosmolo-nigology’ of the great Pangloss, but his own ex- 
periences leave him sorely perplexed again and again. “If 
this is the best of possible worlds, what must the others be 
like!” But he never gives up hope; fleeing from Portugal 
and bound for Paraguay, he remarks: “Now we are going 
to another world, . . . it is in that one, no doubt, that all 
is well.” And all is well : in Eldorado 1 But outside of Eldo- 
rado, even Candide in the course of time becomes weary of 
Pangloss’ philosophizing: “Tha t  is well said,-but we 
should cultivate our garden.” 
This in fact was Voltaire’s solution, in so f a r  as he had 
any solution. Renouncing theodicy and entangled in the gray 
webs of doubt, he never lost his faith in civilization; this a t  
least was a t  hand and reliable : cultivating our garden, “Let 
us work without reasoning; . . . this is the only way of 
making life endurable.” One can live through Monday by 
this gospel alone; whether intelligent man can thus live 
through the week of life is an open question, which we can 
not quite ignore. But it was not with this question that Rous- 
seau confronted Voltaire; rather, with the bold assertion 
that Voltaire had made a cosmic tragedy of evils which for 
the most part  man had brought on himself, and that pre- 
cisely by becoming civilized. So the issue was sharply drawn. 
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T o  appreciate the violence and the immediate effective- 
ness of Rousseau’s attack on civilization, we should keep in 
mind the fundamental contrast which this dalliant vagabond 
genius presented to the culture of his time. H e r e  was a man 
hypersensitive, violently lyrical, irresponsible, nomadic, with 
a longing for  the ideal and a leaning for the degenerate. 
Sentimental like his father who gave him his early maudlin 
training, and like his father, unstable; a coward before 
duty yet reckless in adventure ; chafing under the hardships 
of one trade after another, and running away from his na- 
tive town, Geneva, in order to  escape a beating from his 
master; induced to change his Calvinist faith by E‘ather 
Pontverre’s excellent Frangi wine, Mme. D e  Warens’ fine 
blue eyes, and the dazzling prospect of a trip over the Alps ; 
disgusted with the priests that made him Catholic; tasting 
the bitterness of the lackey’s life in Turin and a t  the same 
time glowing with his sense of inner superiority to his out- 
ward status, yet with dastardly cruelty ruining a young ser- 
vant girl’s future by falsely accusing her of theft merely i n  
order to avoid a slight personal embarrassment; sighing im- 
patiently for his great chance, but incapable of steady pur- 
suit of the real opportunity presented to  him by Count Gou- 
von; running away from his slow good fortune in order to 
follow another young vagabond who had caught his fancy; 
living on the bounty of Mme. De Warens, trying study, try- 
ing music, going off with his music master, only to abandon 
him in Lyons when the old man falls down on a street corner 
in an epileptic fit; advancing slowly from a charlatan to 
something of an expert in music; living on terms of irrespon- 
sible intimacy with Mme. D e  Warens ;  dreaming of the 
brilliant future that is to atone for his undistinguished pres- 
ent and disreputable past;  and then going off to Paris a t  the 
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age of twenty-nine to conquer the world with a new system 
of musical notation. 
T h e  Academy of Inscriptions damns him with faint praise; 
he languishes hoping for the smiles of great ladies, and gets 
some; goes off to  Venice as able secretary to  an incompetent 
and unjust ambassador; in spite of efficient personal record 
is dismissed without pay, and finds officialdom as slow to 
recognize a plebeian’s just claims against aristocracy as 
academies of learning to  welcome a new idea. And so, 
chafing and rebellious, he sees his years pass and leave 
him behind, unrecognized and misunderstood, his life one of 
ardent longing, inarticulate, unrealized. “Deep down within 
him,” Gerhard Gran writes, “there constantly muttered a 
still inarticulate protest ; the Genevan in him revolted against 
the worldly splendour he saw about him, the vagabond was 
sometimes seized by an inexpressible longing to get away 
from the golden cage of the artificial world in which he felt 
imprisoned, the democrat was off ended in his innermost 
depths a t  the sight of the social chasms that separated hu- 
man beings, the mystic shivered in the cold atmosphere of 
intellect in which he moved.” 
Almost two-thirds of his life are gone, when suddenly 
like a flash of lightning he sees the wisdom which is to be his 
wisdom, and like a peal of thunder he makes it reverberate 
all over the world. Rousseau’s own account of his conver- 
sion is justly famous: it reveals him so vividly that after 
reading it we need not be surprised a t  his gospel. Walking 
one hot afternoon on the road from Paris to  Vincennes, 
bound on a visit to Diderot, he read in a newspaper the an- 
nouncement of a prize essay set by the Dijon Academy on 
the subject : “ H a s  the restoration of the sciences and the 
arts contributed to  purify o r  to  corrupt manners?” “If ever 
anything resembled a sudden inspiration,” he writes, “it was 
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the movement which began in me as I read this. All a t  once 
I felt myself dazzled by a thousand sparkling lights; crowds 
of vivid ideas thronged into my mind with a force and con- 
fusion that threw me into unspeakable agitation; I felt my 
head whirling in a giddiness like that of intoxication. A 
violent palpitation oppressed me; unable to walk for dif- 
ficulty of breathing, I sank under one of the trees of the 
avenue, and passed half an hour there in such a condition 
of excitement, that when I arose I saw that the front of my 
waistcoat was all wet with my tears, though I was wholly 
unconscious of shedding them. Ah, if I could ever have writ- 
ten the quarter of what I saw o r  felt under that tree, with 
what clearness should I have brought out all the contradic- 
tions of our social system; with what simplicity I should 
have demonstrated that man is good naturally, and that by 
institutions only is he made bad.” 
Some of this is probably maudlin romancing, but that all 
of it was pure invention, that Rousseau’s first plan was to  
write the usual hackneyed essay in praise of culture, and 
that Diderot suggested to  him the less conventional idea, 
does not rest on sufficient evidence. W h a t  was revolutionary 
was not Rousseau’s thesis itself, that arts and sciences have 
served to corrupt society; the Dijon Academy was of course 
prepared fo r  an essay on the negative side of the question 
proposed, and the thing had been done before. W h a t  was 
original in Rousseau’s thesis was “the fervour, sincerity, and 
conviction of a most unacademic sort with which it was pre- 
sented and enforced.’’ Rousseau’s whole life had been a 
preparation fo r  this essay : this harangue which shocked and 
impressed all France was in fact an apology for his own 
life. T h e  intensity is lyrically motivated. T h e  question of the 
Dijon Academy, as he says, “suddenly opened his eyes, 
brought order into the chaos of his mind, revealed a new 
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world to him, a true golden age, a society made up of nat- 
ural, wise, happy creatures, and brought him the hope of 
realizing all his visions, by destroying all the prejudices to 
which he himself had formerly been subjected, but in which 
he a t  that moment believed that he saw the origin of all 
the vices and miseries of mankind.” 
Rousseau’s first complaint of civilization is the complaint 
of a Diogcnes. I n  plain noonday he searches Paris over with 
a lantern looking vainly for a real man, and finding only 
varnished masks. H e  finds, in place of genuine ardor, stere- 
otyped, elegant passion; artificial and deceptive politeness in- 
stead of candor, the same conventional veneer on all sides 
hiding the real individual ; cowardice and hypocrisy, arro- 
gance o r  servility according to  the code that imposes itself 
on each man, to keep him in his place. And in this soil of 
cultured artificiality vices and depravity flourish like weeds : 
no more sincere friendship, genuine respect, firm confidence; 
instead of these, suspicion, slander, fear, arrogance, treach- 
ery, all hiding beneath a uniform and perfidious veil of 
etiquette. 
This corruption of human nature, Rousseau declares, not 
only follows the spread of the arts and sciences, but it is in  
proportion to that spread, and is indeed the effect of the 
spread. Egypt, Greece, Rome, the Empires of the Orient 
one and all went down in decay and degradation due to their 
becoming civilized. But the rude races of history, the earlier 
Romans, the Scythians, the Germans abide in history as 
models of pure, simple, soundheart human nature. T o  the 
defenders of the arts and the sciences Rousseau sought to  
make his point clear; so he writes to King Stanislas: “ I t  is 
not from science, I am told, but from riches that, in all ages, 
sprang nobility and luxury. I never said that luxury was the 
child of science, but that they were born together and that 
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one could not go  without the other. This is how I arranged 
this genealogy. The first source of all evil is inequality: 
f rom inequality sprang riches . . . from riches, luxury and 
idleness. From luxury came the fine arts, and from idleness, 
science.” 
And what is the origin of inequality, the fountain-source 
of all evil? Rousseau gave his answer in his second essay, a 
necessary corollary to the first. In this revolutionary work, 
Rousseau painted the life of the savage as a life of uncor- 
rupted virtue and freedom. a life in which there obtained 
physical inequalities of strength and skill, but no artificial 
enslavement of man by man : instead of this, simple coopera- 
tion in a rudimentary society, utilizing the abilities of each 
for the good of all, and elementary comfort of life without 
luxury, but also without squalor. I n  learning how to  work 
metals and to cultivate the soil, man saw opportunities 
to grow above the heads of his fellows; this chance he took, 
and the institution of private property, raising the rich over 
the poor, demanded a social and political order that  would 
safely and permanently keep the poor under the heel of the 
rich: and this is indeed the clear though not always frankly 
avowed purpose of governments, enslavers of mankind. 
Private property and the inequality which it breeds and 
signalizes is the root of the tree civilization, of which arts 
and sciences are the blossoms, and moral corruption and 
misery the fruits. “The  first man who, having enclosed a’ 
piece of ground, could think of saying, This is mine, and 
found people simple enough to believe him, was the real 
founder of civil society. H o w  many crimes, wars, murders, 
miseries, and horrors would not have been spared to the 
human race by one who, plucking up the stakes, o r  filling in 
the trench, should have called out to  his fellows: Beware 
of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you 
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forget that the earth belongs to 110 one, and that its fruits 
are for all.” 
T o  Voltaire, Rousseau’s thought and practice seemed 
alike misguided. “I have received, sir,” he wrote him, “your 
new book against mankind. . . . Never before has as much 
wit been devoted to render us all  stupid brutes; on reading 
your work, one is moved to walk on all fours.” Rousseau did 
not miss the opportunity of returning the compliment when 
Voltaire’s poem on the Lisbon earthquake appeared. Ex- 
cepting death, which is scarcely in itself an evil, he says, 
most of our physical ills are due to our own perverted form 
of life. I s  nature to blame that 20,000 houses, all six o r  
seven stories high, were huddled together in an earthquake 
a rea?  H a d  the inhabitants of Lisbon lived as nature in- 
tended man to live, as primitive men live in the plains or 
forests, the few who first felt the tremor would speedily 
have fled across the fields, and in any case would have been in 
no imminent danger. Besides, who knows, perhaps those who 
died in Lisbon escaped thereby worse and more prolonged 
sufferings. Rousseau repeats familiar arguments from Pope 
and Leibniz: If God exists, H e  is perfect, H e  is wise, 
puissant, and just; then all is well, and our souls are im- 
mortal, and it makes little difference whether we do o r  do 
not live thirty years longer; and perhaps these thirty years 
which I miss are necessary to the order of the universe. 
But the important difference between Voltaire and Rous- 
seau is not in their views of Divine Providence. W h a t  is 
significant is their estimate of civilization in relation to their 
estimate of nature and God. Voltaire, as we have seen, 
while despairing of finding evidence of a providential plan 
o r  meaning in this sorry world, yet never loses his confi- 
dence in the upward climb of man o r  his faith in enlighten- 
ment. But Voltaire despised the stupid masses: oxen that 
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need yoke, whip, and hay. Life is a sorry jest, which intelli- 
gence may enable us to  understand and endure. Now Rous- 
seau took just the opposite view : praising the Lord, clinging 
to  the faith which Voltaire unsettled, glorifying nature and 
the free, ignorant savage, and tracing all our evils to the 
very civilization in which Voltaire found man’s one glimmer 
of comfort. So in the significant contrast which we are here 
observing, it is Rousseau who appears as the pessimist,- 
disdainer of civilization and of the cultural values as per- 
versions of the primitive soundheart nature. 
But what is this nature which Rousseau worships as per- 
fect and the corruption of which by society and civilization 
he constantly bewails? T h e  concept of nature has not been 
defined clearly by Rousseau, nor has he used it consistently 
in a manner to  allow of precise definition by others. Hoff- 
ding has distinguished three views of nature which may be 
found in Rousseau’s works. “Nature,” in a theological sense, 
is for Rousseau the simplicity and harmony of God’s original 
creation, contrasted with its artificial perversion by civilized 
man. Man  has distorted God’s work: salvation thus in- 
volves the restoration of the majestic simplicity of God’s 
creation. In a naturalistic sense, “nature” is purely instinc- 
tive existence, without reflection or imagination, a life of 
action in response to purely physical needs and stimuli. T h e  
transformation of this life into that of civilization is un- 
wholesome and unnatural: “If nature destined us to a 
healthy life, I dare almost affirm that the state of reflection 
is a state contrary to  nature, and that thinking man is a 
depraved animal.” 
Rousseau’s third use of the term “nature” is in a psycho- 
logical sense. In  affirming the essential and natural good- 
ness of man, Rousseau means that man’s fundamental, 
primitive impulses are good : men are evil, but man is good. 
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This is the appeal to the heart, to those inner feelings and 
longings in which man, despite untoward circumstances and 
an unfortunate o r  even disreputable career in society, may 
yet claim for himself the virtue and the precious worth for 
which his heart thirsts. H e r e  is perhaps the most significant 
strain in Housseau’s thinking: this flood of feeling in which 
all literature was soon to be submerged, this protesting and 
craving individualism of the misunderstood, of the insulted 
and injured, the eulogy of the vagabond and his inner al- 
leged purity, the cult of the criminal and the prostitute, vic- 
tims of circumstance and social inequity and iniquity. Rous- 
seau in Venice weeps a t  the feet of Zulietta, and with better 
right in cold Petersburg, Raskolnikov is to weep a t  the feet 
of Sonia. This third view of nature is manifest in the nos- 
talgic, wistful, and only half-expressible emotionalism, sen- 
timent that could degenerate into sentimentality, a heart- 
breaking sense of alienation in the actual and the hunger of 
the heart after vanished o r  unrealized perfection: the indi- 
vidualism of sensitive suffering souls for whom this world 
was too much, yet who like Rousseau felt stifled in the uni- 
verse. I t  is the quintessence of romanticism. 
So we find these central ideas of Rousseau in  his three 
major works which in a sense form a trilogy: “ M a n  is born 
free, and everywhere he is in chains.” Taking man as he is, 
what should be done to  save or to recover for man as much 
of the freedom of his primitive state of nature as is possible 
in civil society? This  is the theme of the Contrat Social. 
I n  La Nouvelle Heloise  Rousseau exalts unconstrained, 
straightforward love in contrast to the elegant convention- 
alized passions of the salon. This  is the emotional romantic 
return to  nature, to  genuine and unashamed and consuming 
devotion. And in &mile he would safeguard through educa- 
tion man’s natural gifts, and thus allow them free range to 
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develop and come to fruition, so that the human nature of 
the child, created perfect by God, may not be allowed to 
degenerate by social maleducation. And the same redemp- 
tion of human nature from the corruptions of civilization he 
proposes in man’s religious life, in the Profession de Foi du 
Yicaire Savoyard:  not a Christianity of theological rigid or- 
thodoxy, elaborate ritual, ecclesiastic pomp and circum- 
stance, but rather an intimate mystical-emotional faith, indi- 
vidual, spontaneous outpouring of the human soul, a religion 
of tenderness, charity, trust, and soul-soothing quietism. 
Thus  we see Rousseau chafing in the straitjacket of civi- 
lization, wriggling uncomfortably, and trying to win for 
himself and for others as large a measure as might be of 
that blessed lost freedom and spontaneity which, as he 
imagined, uncorrupted primitive man possessed. 
There  is little logic or consistency in his works, and less 
of it in his life. T h e  man who advocated education of chil- 
dren according to nature, had turned his own children one 
after the other to the Foundlings’ Asylum. T h e  man who 
glorified the simple life of freedom in the bosom of nature 
lived his life as the prottg6 of one aristocrat after another. 
T h e  man who exalted intimate and utter personal devotion 
was morbidly suspicious of his own friends and forgot o r  
lost them in a manner that is apt to invite mingled contempt 
and pity. And yet the ideas which so passionately possessed 
him, and the new passions to  which he gave so thrilling an 
utterance, became mighty forces in the thought and in the 
life of mankind. 
Shall we dispose of the matter easily by styling Rousseau- 
ism the vagabond tradition in our modern life, the impetu- 
ous outpouring of the uncontrolled, the defiant protest of 
the submerged, the sentimental pathos of the morbid, the 
neglected intimate, and the misunderstood? Is distrust of 
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Rousseauism and resistance to  its romantic nonsense an 
acid test of sanity in a modern man?  So large and so real ele- 
ments of truth are implied in the very asking of these ques- 
tions that one is only too apt to lapse into error by mistaking 
the partial for the more complete truth. T h e  verdict which 
Rousseau passed on civilization and on our cultural values 
can be estimated in more adequate and more contemporary 
terms if we consider in this connection the gospel preached 
in our own day by the man whom we may regard as Rous- 
seau’s greatest pupil, for he was more than a mere pupil: 
a volcano of passions but also a granite-wall of resolute 
will, an iconoclast less sentimental and more candid and 
heroic than Rousseau. 
There  is a mistaken notion that a t  the age of fifty, after 
he had written W a r  and Peace and Anna Karenina, Tolstoy 
suddenly turned right about face and changed his entire 
course and view of life. On more careful scrutiny, however, 
we find in the later Tolstoy only the explicit recognition of 
a truth which must have been lurking in his inner being all 
his life. His favorite game as a child was to search for the 
green stick on which was carved the secret of universal 
happiness. This green stick was supposedly buried some- 
where on the family estate, but the children never found 
it, for an essential condition of success while looking for it 
was not to  think of a white bear. Tolstoy’s whole life may 
be called the hunt for  the green stick of blessedness, H e  
sought it in the transports of passion and in the thrill of the 
gambling table, in the vast calm and untamed grandeur of 
elemental nature, in the daredevil intoxication of ever- 
present death and in the hardening of the soul through war, 
in the serene joys of a happy family life, in the glowing 
sense of ever-growing literary fame, social prestige, power 
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of wealth: ever insatiate and never satisfied. When he had 
seemingly scaled the heights of human ambition, he recoiled 
from life: the height on which he stood was the brink of an 
abyss. 
T h e  more he saw of life, the more he thought, the less 
satisfied he became. “Wha t  is the meaning of it all?” he kept 
asking himself. H e  had six thousand desyatines of land in 
the government of Samara, and three hundred horses. Sup- 
pose he had sixty thousand desyatines, and as many horses: 
what then? He was a famous writer. But suppose he became 
still more famous, more famous than Gogol, than Pushkin, 
Shakespeare, MoliZre, than any writer in the world: what 
then? Wha t  was it all about? W h y  should he, Count Tol- 
stoy, author of W a r  and Peace and A n n a  Karenina, with his 
thousands of acres, horses, healthy, rich, respected, admired, 
loved, possessing all that men desire; why should he be 
living a t  all? “Is there any meaning in my life,” he asked, 
“which will not be destroyed by the inevitable death await- 
ing me?  . . . I felt that the ground on which I stood was 
crumbling, that there was nothing for me to  stand on, that 
what I had been living for was nothing, that I had no reason 
for living.” 
T h e  problem is radical enough, and Tolstoy’s solution of 
it was as bold and radical. T h e  enlightened men of his own 
class seemed to be in the dark as f a r  as the question of ulti- 
mate values and lasting satisfaction was concerned, so he 
turned to the peasants, amazed for the first time in his life 
by the idea that, despite their poverty and ignorance, they 
lived contentedly on their bread and onions. There  must be 
a real meaning in life, he thought, and in their humble way 
they must know this meaning. T h e  peasants told him to  live 
according to Christ’s law, and in all sincerity Tolstoy tried 
to  find this law in  the ospels. H i s  discoveries were 
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revolutionary. H e  found in the Sermon on the Mount five 
commandments, like five signposts pointing him to  solid 
ground out of his spiritual quagmires. 
Jesus condemned murderous anger and contumely, and 
preached considerate and generous respect of man for man. 
Jesus branded sensuality, veiled o r  unveiled, the flagrant o r  
the contemplated degradaton of woman to  serve as a mere 
instrument of lust. Jesus denounced the willing surrender of 
a man’s free conscience to his official superiors implied in 
the taking of military or bureaucratic oaths of unquestion- 
ing obedience. Jesus tore down the barriers separating one 
nation from another, and applied the moral law to  inter- 
national relations : not merely love your neighbor but love 
your enemy, the alien, love all mankind. And fifthly, in a 
commandment which Tolstoy regarded as the keystone of 
his moral edifice, Jesus condemned unreservedly the use 
of force and the law of retribution, and preached the law of 
love, non-resistance. Tolstoy observed that these command- 
ments of Jesus ran, not only counter to the general practice 
of society, but in some cases also counter to  the avowed prin- 
ciples on which the social order rested. T h e  search for 
spiritual peace had sent him to  the Gospels, and what he 
learned there involved him in a radical critique of the life 
and of the fundamental ideas of modern civilization. 
T h e  root of evil, Tolstoy declared, is selfish exploitation 
of man by man. This lust for self-assertion and self-gratifi- 
cation, sexual, economic, political, social, intellectual, taints 
the entire system of so-called civilized life. W e  imprison or 
exile or kill those whom we have not reformed o r  who have 
not reformed us. W e  employ the best years of a nation’s 
manhood in the training of men to kill other men similarly 
trained. W e  hold sacrosanct an economic system in which 
one man luxuriates while and often just because a hundred 
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starve. W e  condone lust, glorify it in literature and provide 
for it in practice, whether in the form of regulated o r  un- 
regulated prostitution o r  in the less candid form of unstable 
pretended marriages. A t  the basis of our systems of law 
and public security is hatred masked as righteous indigna- 
tion, and the spirit of revenge parading as retributive justice. 
And we declare that philanthropy is well enough in its place, 
but that we must have no nonsense but force and violent 
compulsion, i f  civilization and the social order is to be 
maintained. 
W h a t  are we to do, then? Shall we withdraw from this 
wicked world to live the romantic hermit life A la Rousseau, 
in the bosom of uncorrupted nature? O r  shall we resign our- 
selves to the inevitable, considering that the whole system 
of society involves exploitation, that we cannot change the 
system, that our drop in the bucket doesn’t make any dif- 
ference one way or the other, and we should not make our- 
selves miserable over i t ?  Tolstoy took a different stand, and 
here his integrity puts Rousseau to  shame. Rousseau’s at- 
tack on civilization is largely an apology for his own life. 
Society is to blame, not he. Even in his Colzfessions Rous- 
seau challenges mankind to  show a better man than himself. 
H e  saw himself as a victim, never as a villain; even his re- 
morse over his vices only illustrates the wretchedness of 
the environment that had perverted him o r  hampered his 
true self-expression. 
Tolstoy is of a different temper, H e  begins with himself. 
W h a t  is to be done, means to him: W h a t  am I, Lyof Tol- 
stoy, to d o ?  H e r e  I have been writing world-famous novels, 
and have been portraying the tree of human life, its decayed 
and leafless branches, but what am I really? One of the 
caterpillars on the tree of human life. I criticize exploita- 
tion, and myself exploit people and live comfortably on 
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their daily toil. I, Lyof Tolstoy, am like a horseman who 
observes that the horse he rides is exhausted. W h a t  is to 
be done? Write fine books about tired horses; remain seated 
on the horse’s back and philanthropically hold up the beast’s 
head? No, but first of all get off the horse’s back. Before 
I can honestly engage in philanthropy and undertake to  re- 
lieve the sufferings of the poor, I must stop living a form 
of life that necessarily causes poverty in the social order. 
This problem, Tolstoy says, is quite simple, and is made 
complicated only by those who do not wish to solve it in 
their own lives. T h e  Chinese say: “If there is one man 
idle, there is another dying of hunger.” If I consume what 
I have not myself produced, I am simply eating the dinner 
which someone else has earned and doesn’t get, and no 
amount of argument can change the ugly fact. 
H e r e  then I must start. I must make other men work for 
me as little as possible, and must myself work as much as 
possible. I can take care of my own room, I can look after 
my own garden, I can clean my boots, indeed, I can make my 
boots, I can go into the fields and by honest labor produce 
the equivalent of the food which I eat. And only when I 
have done this, my own share of the daily labor upon which 
the sustaining of human life depends, only then can I pre- 
sume to talk of philanthropy o r  teaching my fellow-men o r  
the higher life. I cannot write novels, o r  philosophize, or 
make a catalogue of a million beetles, o r  calculate the dis- 
tances of the stars, o r  paint sunsets and compose sympho- 
nies, and count myself superior to the ignorant and ill- 
smelling peasant who in the meantime has been feeding me, 
o r  worse yet, who has been producing the bread which I eat 
today while I, captain of trade or finance, manipulate the 
market so that his bread and that of thousands of others 
may be gathered into my storerooms. ’This supposed 
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division of labor, Tolstoy says, is a subtle fallacy with which 
we seek to  cover a plain and ugly fact. I t  is a fact that in 
one day o r  even in one hour a skillful commercial transaction 
may make me the legal possessor of what thousands have 
labored for days or months to produce. I t  is a fact, but it is 
none the less iniquitous, and the civilization that sanctions 
it has not been touched with the true spirit of Christ. And 
the alleged superiority and dignity of mental work is sub- 
ject to  a similar criticism. W h y  am I the choice beneficiary 
of the social o rder?  Because of my supposed high order of 
intelligence, because of my genius? But in that case I should 
be able to see more clearly than others this real truth of 
human life, and seeing it should mend my life accordingly. 
T h e  maximum time that I can spend in really profitable 
mental work, that is work vigorous and not detrimental to 
mind o r  body, is five hours daily. I sleep eight hours. W h a t  
do  I do with the eleven hours that remain? Let  me spend 
part  of that time in relieving the peasant in his manual 
labor, so that he may have a chance to think a t  least half an 
hour. 
But you say that modern civilized life is too complicated 
to allow of such transformation? So much the worse for 
civilized life, then. This gaudy edifice of culture does not 
atone for the misery of millions on which it rests, nor is it 
worth the human price which its elegant beneficiaries pay 
for it. “The  greater part  of my life and yours is taken up 
with satisfying, not our natural wants, but wants invented 
by us, or artificially inoculated by our education, and that 
have become habitual to us ;  and nine tenths of the work 
which we devote to satisfying these demands is idle work.” 
So Tolstoy condemned the powers of darkness within us: 
violence, arrogance, lust, desire to oppress, exploitation. H e  
saw these as it were inextricably bound up with modern 
The Despair of Civilization 65 
civilization. T o  rid human life of them he was prepared to 
sacrifice civilization. And he conceived of another social 
order in which men labored in the spirit of brotherhood, 
each doing his share, each freely bringing to  mankind his 
peculiar gift of intelligence or intense, exquisite feeling 
o r  spiritual genius. I n  this social order of Tolstoy’s vision, 
agriculture, industry, and trade involved no exploitation; 
science and philosophy truly enlightened human life; a r t  
was not aristocratic and exclusive, but rather perfected 
the universal communion of men in the direct language of  
feeling; and religion, instead of chaining men to stony creeds 
and wooden ritual, knit men together in living brotherhood, 
entered the human soul and opened its windows to admit 
the sunlight of God. 
W e  need not waste time criticizing the details of Tolstoy’s 
own practice as a reformer, but remember his words writ- 
ten to Engelhardt in 1882, words which he could have 
written with even stronger conviction twenty-five years later : 
“People say to me, ‘Well, Lyof Nikolaevitch, as f a r  as 
preaching goes, you preach; but how about your practice?’ 
T h e  question is a perfectly natural one; it is always put to  
me, and it always shuts my mouth. . . . Condemn me, i f  
you choose,-but condemn me, and not the path which I 
am following. . . . If I know the road home, and if I go 
along it drunk, and staggering from side to side, does that 
prove that the road is not the right one? . . . Do not 
yourselves confuse and mislead me, and then rejoice over 
it and cry, ‘Look a t  him! H e  says he is going home, and he 
is floundering into the swamp!’ . . . M y  heart is breaking 
with despair because we have all lost the road;  and while I 
struggle with all my strength to find it, and keep in it, you, 
instead of pitying me when I go astray, cry triumphantly, 
‘See ! H e  is in the swamp with us I’  ” 
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If we are candid, we are bound to  admit the evils in our 
modern civilized society which Tolstoy so vividly exposes to 
view. But before we can pass judgment on his remedies, the 
conclusions of his diagnosis must be estimated. Because the 
evils which Tolstoy combats are so largely evils of civilized 
life, does it follow that civilization as such is an evil, and 
that moral progress and cultural progress conflict essentially 
and all along the line? 
Our  age burns incense on the altars of progress, but is 
getting decidedly dubious regarding its idolatry. T h e  rapid- 
ity with which so much of our boasted humane culture col- 
lapsed a t  the first impact of savage, elemental forces during 
the Great W a r :  the backdown of organized labor, the ready 
acquiescence of academic and literary leadership, the prosti- 
tution of organized religion in the service of international 
slaughter, the diabolical application of the latest science and 
the most expert technology to the perfecting of engines of 
war, particularly in the use of poison gases, the extension of 
hostilities to the submarine and air-regions, increasingly 
dangerous to numberless non-combatants, and the cynical 
humiliation to which the noblest purposes of man were sub- 
jected by the turn of international politics after the con- 
clusion of the proclaimed W a r  to End W a r :  all these have 
made many men draw back in dismay, distrusting the God- 
dess Civilization, and doubting the stability and the essen- 
tial soundness of the whole structure of Western Culture. 
This confirmed or incipient social pessimism is not without 
grounds; these last years have served only to exhibit more 
obviously the seamy underside of the outwardly resplendent 
cloak of modern civilization. I n  our modern age we have 
perfected technical skill beyond the wildest dreams of the 
past, have harnessed nature to do our bidding, have almost 
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abolished time and space; but have we become spiritually 
cosmopolitan, citizens of the cosmos? Have  we, in tran- 
scending the provincial boundaries of our material environ- 
ment, transcended and overcome likewise spiritual provin- 
cialism? I n  the amazing perfection of our means of com- 
munication, have we perfected correspondingly our sense 
of ultimate direction? W e  move much faster; do we know 
any more clearly whither we are going, the nature of our 
journey o r  our destination? W e  can  share our ideas so 
much more readily and universally : that is, share them with 
eye and ear ;  but what is the final meaning of what we have 
to  say to  each o ther?  Is it not one of the deplorable aspects 
of our modern civilization that spiritual culture has lagged 
behind material progress, that we see all about us veriest 
apes of the spirit manipulating the latest devices of applied 
science, as if  the jungle itself were equipped with wireless 
and radio for the broadcasting of simian wisdom? 
Let  us ask, then: Does the disdain of civilization rest on 
a sound diagnosis, and are Rousseau’s o r  Tolstoy’s pro- 
posed remedies really appropriate ? Civilization does in- 
volve perversion and corruption of human life, but is it 
only o r  essentially corruption and perversion that it in- 
volves ? Is civilization adequately defined as perversion and 
corruption? Rousseau, Tolstoy, and other social pessimists 
condemn the cultural process because of the evils in which 
it is entangled. This condemnatory verdict is a wholesome 
shock to rouse man from the slumber of cultural compla- 
cency, but it is none the less one-sided. A more careful insight 
into the relation of civilization to morality and perfection 
generally discloses the deeper truth as lying between the 
two shallower extremes of complacency and despair. This 
deeper truth we may formulate as follows: the advance of 
civilization does not involve the perfection nor yet the 
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perversion of human nature; that  is to say, neither one of 
these two to the exclusion of the other. W h a t  we call the 
advance of civilization is rather the spread of the field on 
which human aims are  pursued, realized, or  frustrated: a 
spread and an intensification, enhancement of all available 
values, positive and negative. Civilization is a great oppor- 
tunity, but it is also a grave hazard :  in its advance man 
learns how high lie can rise, but also how low he can fall. 
This  essential truth may be examined and exhibited in 
detail in every field of human endeavor. T h e  more complex 
our civilization, the more varied, the subtler, the more mo- 
mentous become both attainment and frustration, whether 
moral, intellectual, zsthetic, o r  religious. Read and reinter- 
pret  the decalogue in terms of modern civilized experience. 
“Thou shall not kill-shalt not steal-shalt not covet :” 
observe the almost measureless expanse of range alike in 
vice and in opposite virtue here. These commandments have 
mellowed, enriched in meaning; they are  much more diffi- 
cult to fulfill than in primitive life, but the virtues they in- 
culcate are  also loftier and richer. Consider justice or  broth- 
erhood, and see the sweep in range of meaning in them as 
a result of civilization. In  the realm of science the same 
results obtain. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and 
still more dangerous is much knowledge: dangerous in its 
disturbing of traditional stolidity, dangerous in its being 
misapprehended and misapplied, a sword double-edged in 
possibly foolish hands. Shall we say then: Blessed are  the 
ignorant, o r  repeat the words of Dostoyevsky : ‘&In Germany 
everyone can read and write, but everyone is stupid,” imply- 
ing presumably the rare wisdom of the illiterate Russian 
peasant? Intellectual progress is an opportunity and a haz- 
ard,  even in purely intellectual terms: every solution only 
serves to give rise to still vaster problems, in which the 
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chance of greater truth is confronted with the chance of 
more serious error, truth and error alike increasingly funda- 
mental. So in a r t :  success and failure alike are in the be- 
ginner elementary, but in the work of the master both are 
complex and grave : a child’s house of blocks compared with 
a Gothic cathedral, a primitive woman’s crooning against a 
Beethoven symphony. So even more truly is it in religion. 
Man’s idea of God gains in significance, but also in complex- 
ity. Piety in civilized life may be more profound, but it is 
likewise immeasurably more difficult than in primitive 
religion. 
This view of human life cannot be described either as 
optimistic o r  as pessimistic. Dispiriting to the laggard, it is 
a challenge inspiring to  the heroic in human nature. T h e  
parable of the servant who hid the single talent entrusted 
to him may here be adapted to  our purpose. Spiritual life 
is a venture in values: to  him that hath shall be given: this 
is the promise to  the aspiring; but from him that hath not 
even that which he hath shall be taken away: this is the cen- 
sure of the slothful and stagnating. And the old stories of 
Prometheus and the Garden of Eden may now be seen in a 
somewhat new light. T h e  uprising of man from the so- 
called state of nature to the level of civilization is both 
tragic and sublime. T h e  tree of knowledge is the tree of the 
knowledge of good and of evil: eating of it cost 
man his primitive paradisiacal innocence, and it was 
his first sin and guilt, and made man’s life a tragic enter- 
prise; but it also made him a traveler on the road of real 
moral attainment and moral dignity : deliberate, aspiring, 
heroic. N o t  in the unruffled innocence of Paradise, but in 
the storm and stress of spiritual endeavor is man’s real, 
living perfection to  be sought. “The  best world for a moral 
70 The Problem of Evil 
agent,” Royce told us, “is one that needs him to make it 
better.” 
Man’s true path upward is not in negating civilization, 
not in utopian simplification of modern life, though ‘Tolstoy 
is to be honored for having pointed out how much larger a 
share of homely self-reliance is possible for man even in the 
present highly specialized social order. Tolstoy himself 
did not utterly fail to recognize that evil is not to be reme- 
died simply by a change of environment o r  reorganization of 
the social structure, but through a personal reformation of 
one’s own life in the social system in which one lives, a 
system, however, which must never be allowed to overawe 
the individual’s conscience. T h e  problem which modern so- 
ciety presents to the alert individual conscience is this : how 
may I participate in this complex life of civilization, yet in 
and through it contribute to  the attainment of ever more 
adequate fair play, economic and social and international 
and inter-racial justice? Tolstoy even in his ploughing and 
cobbling was still Tolstoy, but how are those millions for 
whom ploughing or cobbling, those for whom factory, shop 
or  store, is the day’s work, how are they to find in the vast 
complex social enterprise of modern civilization, in which 
they must participate, meaning and satisfaction and stimu- 
lus, sweetness and light? This  is a fundamental problem of 
modern civilization, but this problem is not solved by the 
utopian proposal to  reject culture and seek perfection in 
peasant o r  in primitive conditions of life. I n  saying this I do 
not for one moment seek to  dismiss the truth, so forcibly ut- 
tered by Tolstoy, that the callous exploitation of man by 
man is essentially vicious, and that morality demands re- 
spect for the spiritual dignity of our fellowmen and whole- 
hearted participation in the work and in the larger life of 
mankind. But the attainment of this goal demands, not the 
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cultural impoverishment of humanity, but rather the spiri- 
tual and moral enrichment of  our cultural inheritance. 
This treatment of the particular problem of social and 
cultural pessimism suggcsts some of the more ultimate is- 
sues in which the entire problem of value, good and evil, is 
involved, and the conclusions which appear as reason- 
able. I t  may perhaps be of interest to mention some of 
these conclusions briefly, partly by way of summary and 
more by way of prospectus. Without much argument, I 
simply propose the following theses : 
T h e  world-order is a hierarchy o r  scale of activities, in- 
volving contact and conflict of higher and lower stages of 
being, the scale itself pointing from mechanism to life, to 
consciousness and value, from unconscious and non-rational 
to self-conscious and rational activity, from process in con- 
formity to law to  action on principle and in pursuit of ideal 
goals. T h a t  the higher activities are not as common as the 
lower is an observation neither surprising nor relevant: the 
apex of the pyramid is not any the less the apex because it 
covers less area than the base. 
In  this gradation of activities, the self-maintenance of 
the higher and its reaching out to ever fuller realization and 
self-elevation is progress, whether cosmic, or biologic, o r  
human. T h e  down-pulling incursion of the lower against the 
higher is manifold evil, and i f  successful on the human level 
involves the agent in varieties of vice ; the successful resist- 
ance of man to this baser invasion is virtue. T h e  self-satis- 
faction of the finite a t  any stage of being, i f  personal, is 
complacency, marks stagnation, and is the sin against the 
Holy  Ghost. T h e  sense of inability to maintain oneself on 
high ground o r  to attain ground still higher, as it leads to 
the feeling that the universe is hostile or indifferent to the 
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attainment or enhancement of value, gives rise to a con- 
sciousness of frustration, the tragic sense of life. 
Such a view of existence recognizes unflinchingly the actu- 
ality of evil, but is not on that account led to pessimistic 
despair. Evil is literally degradation, the surrender of the 
higher to the lower in the scale of being. I t  would be possible 
to develop this idea a t  some length, in different fields of ex- 
perience. Pain and disease involve the actual o r  the im- 
pending and threatened disorganization and degradation 
of bodily structure, the breakdown of highly organized into 
more elementary tissue. E r ro r  and fallacy involve the fail- 
ure of the mind to maintain itself on the intelligent, rational 
level. In  the field of art, beauty is always relative to a cer- 
tain development of taste and spiritual heritage and refine- 
ment. So jazz is good music-for savages, but not for the 
heirs of Bach and Beethoven. In  the moral realm the same 
principle holds true. T h a t  which is natural to the beast may 
well be and indeed is a vice in man. In fact, the beast is 
never beastly; man alone can be beastly. Beastliness is not 
mere animality; it  is degradation of the human to the level 
of the beast, a level natural to the beast but unnatural for 
man. T h e  finest example of this truth in tragedy that comes 
to mind is in Hamlet’s scene with his mother: 
Look here upon this picture, and on this, 
T h e  counterfit presentment of two brothers: . . . 
T h i s  was  your husband. Look you now what  follows. 
H e r e  is your husband. . . . Have you eyes? . . . . . . W h a t  Judgment 
W o u l d  step f rom this, t o  this?  
This is the evil: Hamlet’s uncle was no possible mate for 
Queen Gertrude: replacing her former worthy husband by 
this “mildewed ear” calls virtue hypocrite : 
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Takes  off the rose 
F rom the fair forehead of an innocent love, 
And makes a blister there. 
This idea of vice as essentially self-degradation St. Au- 
gustine has expressed in terms of profound insight which 
will bear repeating: “When the will abandons what is above 
itself, and turns to  what is lower, it  becomes evil-not be- 
cause that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning 
itself is wicked.’’ 
As long as the universe retains any character of value, 
this contest, contact and conflict of higher with lower, will 
persist, each achievement opening new prospects, imposing 
new duties, facing new hazards. There  is a grim element in 
this idea; we can apply to our purpose words which Plato 
wrote in the Theaetetus: “Evils . . . can never pass away; 
for there must always remain something which is antagon- 
istic to good.” But another version of the truth, and one 
more inspiriting, we find on a page of Emerson’s: “Within 
every man’s thought is a higher thought: within the char- 
acter he exhibits today, a higher character.” Good and evil 
are not distinct realities, and have no status in isolation: 
they are always relative to  each other. Evil is that ever 
present side o r  factor in the actual world, by resistance to 
which a worthier side reaffirms itself and in being reaffirmed 
becomes better. This contest is a t  the heart of things; it 
has neither beginning nor end, and it makes our world 
significant and stirring. 
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